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The EuroDRG project 
Payment mechanisms represent one of the fundamental building blocks of any health 
system, introducing powerful incentives for actors in the system and important technical 
design challenges. Inpatient case payments, mainly referred to as diagnosis-related 
groups (DRGs), are used nowadays as a payment mechanism with ambitious aims: they 
seek to reimburse providers fairly for the work they undertake. Moreover, they intend to 
encourage efficient delivery and to discourage the provision of unnecessary services. 
Thereby are thought to overcome some of the drawbacks of more traditional hospital 
reimbursement systems. A case payment system that fulfils these hopes requires 
carefully balanced incentives as well as a methodologically sound system. Especially, 
DRGs need to accurately reflect the resources and costs of treating a given patient. 
Fierce debate among practitioners, researchers and the public indicates that case 
payments still pose considerable technical and policy challenges, and many unresolved 
issues in their implementation remain. For example the HealthBASKET, project showed 
that DRG systems differ greatly between European Member States. One of the key 
conclusions of HealthBASKET was that structural components may play an even more 
important role than heterogeneity of treatment patters in cost variations within an 
episode of care. In this context, many European DRG systems may be heading in the 
wrong direction by concentrating almost exclusively on refining the medical classification 
of DRGs. In addition, over the last decade the Europeanization of health service markets 
generated pressure on national reimbursement systems. Increasing patient mobility 
caused growing health system interconnectedness. The EuroDRG project scrutinizes these 
challenges. Part one concentrates on the complexities of case payments for hospitals in 
national contexts. Special emphasis is put on identifying those factors, which are crucial 
for (1) calculating adequate case payments, (2) examining hospital efficiency within 
countries and across Europe fairly and (3) studying the relationship between costs and 
the quality of care provided in hospitals. The project uses comparative analyses of DRG 
systems across 10 European countries embedded in various types of health systems 
(Austria, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, 
Ireland, UK). The second part of the project seeks to identify pan-European issues in 
hospital case payment by conducting cost analysis across European countries. 
Furthermore, the systemic factors, which are crucial for successful policy design in a 
slowly emerging pan-European hospital market, will be identified. Special emphasis is 
placed on (1) identifying ways to calculate these payments in an adequate fashion, (2) 
examining hospital efficiency within and across European countries, and (3) identifying 
factors that affect the relationship between the costs and quality of inpatient care.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The use of case payments intends to provide incentives for cost containment, 
efficiency and – at least in its theoretical formulation – to reward quality (Shleifer 
1985). Although diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) have been used for years in many 
countries, hospital costs do not appear to have converged; indeed, rather large 
variations in hospital cost structures persist (Busse et al. 2008b). This empirical 
observation, various theoretical considerations, and recent policy initiatives to 
extend the scope of DRG systems to private sections of the hospital market, such as 
in England or in France, have led many to rethink the idea that a uniform payment 
for specific health care services can be applied across hospitals.  
Instead, researchers are increasingly recognizing that differences in costs per DRG 
can be due to differences in the following categories of explanatory variables: 
(1) patient mix (e.g. age, gender, socio-economic status, severity),  
(2) diagnostics and treatment (both regarding the use/mix of new and emerging 
technologies as well as the intensity, e.g. physician or nursing time – 
“hospital/medical decision variables”),  
(3) costs per unit of staff or technology (determined either by the hospital managers 
or being beyond their control – “structural variables”) and  
(4) the factors that are included in the costs calculations (hence, the observed 
variations in costs would then be explained through the way costs are calculated, 
and what might be structurally left out).  
The new paradigm in academia is therefore to establish a fair playing field (Mason et 
al. 2008b), which takes cost variation due to factors beyond the control of hospital 
managers into account. The underlying rationale is that the funding formula has to 
take account of “legitimate” cost heterogeneity (due to patient, treatment or 
structural variables) in order to avoid incentivizing unintended consequences in the 
hospital sector such as patient selection, lower quality of care, creaming, skimping 
and dumping (Dormont and Milcent 2004).  
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The purpose of this review is to examine the international evidence for existing 
instruments, systems or concepts for measuring and explaining differences in 
hospital costs. Costs here are defined as costs to the hospital to produce services 
rather than cost to purchasers (“price”), which is revenue from the point of the 
hospital.   
The intention is to review but go beyond consideration of patient case-mix and 
“hospital/medical decision variables”. The key question is to assess the 
(in)adequacyof existing DRG systems with regard to their (risk-)adjustment and to 
identify the structural or regional criteria that might need to be considered in 
analyzing hospital costs.  
The review can be divided into two parts. The first will inform the analytical models 
applied in the analysis of patient-level cost data and in analyzing patient-level length 
of stay (as a proxy for cost) of the EuroDRG project. The objectives of these two 
approaches are the same, namely: 
 To calculate costs (or length of stay) per case for each defined episode of care 
per country; 
 To estimate cost (or length of stay) functions for each episode of care and 
joint functions including all care episodes utilizing the full set of explanatory 
variables across countries; 
 To explore which adjustment factors explain variation in hospital costs (or 
length of stay) per country; 
 To elaborate how far the DRG classification of each country is taking this 
empirically analysed variation in costs (or length of stay) into account, and 
adequately capturing the “legitimate” heterogeneity. 
Empirical studies of variation in hospital costs fall into two camps: those based on 
analysis of the costs of individual patients and those – the vast majority – that 
analyse costs reported at hospital level. In this review, we consider how patient-level 
and hospital-level data are related and outline the approaches to analyzing these 
data. The second part of the review, which concentrates on hospital-level analysis, 
appears in the appendix to maintain a short and concise core text. This part of the 
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review considers general specification choices as well as methods of efficiency 
analysis.  
Define 
ikc  as the cost of treating patient , 1...i i I , in hospital , 1...k k K . It is 
straightforward to add together the costs for each individual patient in each hospital 
to arrive at the hospital’s total cost: 
1
I
k ik
i
TC c          (1) 
For those countries for which individual patient cost data are available, an analysis of 
variation in individual patient costs 
ikc  will be undertaken. We consider how to 
formulate models of patient costs in section 2.1.  
In some countries, patient-level cost data are unavailable, but length of stay can be 
used as a proxy for costs, at least for those episodes of care that are delivered in the 
inpatient setting. The fact that the distributions of cost and length of stay differ 
means that we have to adopt slightly different estimation procedures, and these are 
outlined in section 2.2.  
For completeness, in section 2.3 we also indicate how patient-level cost functions 
are related to hospital-level cost functions typically analysed in the empirical 
literature.  
The primary question of interest is: why do hospital costs or lengths of stay vary 
among patients? Broadly speaking, costs or lengths of stay vary for two reasons: 
 Firstly because patients have very different characteristics or are diagnosed 
and treated differently (the first two sets of variables named above) 
 Secondly because of the characteristics of the hospital where their treatment 
is delivered (both within and beyond the control of hospital managers). 
The research in the EuroDRG project is designed in a way to identify and disentangle 
these reasons. We discuss the type of patient characteristics and hospital 
characteristics that should be accounted for in section 3. 
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2 Conceptual and methodological framework 
2.1 Analysis of patient-level costs 
If patient-level cost data are available, analysis of why costs differ among patients 
can be undertaken by specifying a hierarchical or multi-level model, which 
recognizes that patients (level 1) are clustered within hospitals (level 2). The model 
might take the following general form: 
1
N
ik n ik k ik
n
c x        (2) 
Where 
ikc is the cost of patient i in hospital k, ikx  is a vector of n variables that 
describe patient i in hospital k, regarding their “patient variables”, i.e. medical 
(diagnosis, severity, co-morbidities) and socio-demographic (age, gender, socio-
economic status etc.) characteristics as well as “hospital/medical decision variables”, 
i.e. diagnostics and treatment. These variables will be described at greater length in 
section 3.1. k  captures the hospital influence on costs over and above the patient 
characteristics while ik  is the standard disturbance.  
Typically the distribution of patient costs is positively skewed, with some patients 
having much higher costs than the majority. So as to avoid these high cost patients 
exerted undue influence on the estimated relationships, we convert costs into 
logarithmic form, which serves to normalize the overall distribution of costs. 
Moreover, because there are only two levels to the hierarchy (patients clustered in 
hospitals), equation (1) can be estimated using standard fixed effects or random 
effects panel data models. Which model is most appropriate for the particular 
dataset being analysed can be established by a Hausman test (1978).  
Whether estimated by applying a fixed or random effects model k  are termed 
“hospital effects” and can be interpreted as a measure of hospital performance, 
higher values implying that this hospital’s costs are above average after taking into 
account the characteristics of the patients being treated (Hauck et al. 2003) and the 
choice and intensity of the diagnostics and treatment itself. These estimates ( ˆk ) 
can themselves be analysed to explore reasons why some hospitals appear to have 
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higher costs than others. For instance, costs may vary according to the volume of 
activity if there are economies of scale or may be different in, say, teaching or 
specialist hospitals. We shall consider these characteristics in section 3.2 but, for the 
moment, we summarize them as a vector 
kmz  of m variables measuring hospital 
characteristics (both under and beyond the control of hospital managers). 
One way to account for hospital characteristics is to adopt a single-step process, 
using a model developed by Battese and Coelli (1995). This might take the following 
form: 
1 1
N M
ik n ik k m k k ik
n m
c x z       (3)  
It is not always feasible to estimate this model, particularly the fixed effects 
specification is employed and some hospitals have unique characteristics. This makes 
it impossible to distinguish the influence of the characteristic from the hospital fixed 
effect.  
An alternative is to specify an Estimated Dependent Variable model, as used in 
Laudicella et al. (2009), where ˆk  is regressed against the hospital characteristics: 
1
ˆ
M
k o m k k
m
z
       (4) 
This model forms the standard approach in the EuroDRGs project. For certain 
countries the Battese & Coelli approach may also be explored.  
A major advantage of using patient-level data is that it is not necessary to use the 
legal entity (e.g. hospital) as the unit of analysis. Instead, data can be clustered to 
whatever level is deemed appropriate to the question. Most importantly, the use of 
patient-level data enables consideration of specific production lines, where there is 
likely to be greater standardization in the types of patients treated and activities 
undertaken. For instance, Laudicella et al. (2009) consider patients clustered within 
obstetrics departments and Kristensen et al. (2009) examine costs of hospital care 
for patients admitted with diabetes. The predecessor project to EuroDRG, 
HealthBASKET, used so-called vignettes, which in effect were patients with well-
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defined medical and socio-demographic characteristics, for whom the influence of 
differences in diagnostics/treatment as well as hospital and country characteristics 
were analyzed across nine countries (Busse et al. 2008a). Vignettes included hip 
replacement, stroke, acute myocardial infarction (AMI), child delivery, 
appendectomy and cataract surgery. 
In the EuroDRG project, the intention is to analyse costs for patients classified to the 
same episode of care (building on the vignettes approach, but allowing variability in 
medical and socio-demographic variables). Define an episode of care as j , with 
1...j J  so that there are a total of J episodes of care dealt with in a hospital. This 
means that, instead of estimating equation (1) for all patients in each hospital, it is 
estimated separately for each episode of care of interest: 
1
, 1...
N
ik n ik k ik
n
c j j Jx      (5) 
This enables a better capture of the relevant diagnostics/treatment variables (e.g. 
type of hip implant, bare-metal stent vs. drug-eluting stent in AMI, open vs. 
laparoscopic appendectomy, normal delivery vs. C-section) in ikx  as well as structural 
variables (such as existence of catheter laboratory, stroke unit or neonatal intensive 
care unit) in k . 
2.2 Analysis of patient-level length of stay 
For those countries where patient-level cost data are unavailable, length of stay will 
be analysed as a proxy for cost. The estimation procedure needs to be modified to 
reflect the fact that the distribution of costs differs from that of length of stay. In 
essence, length of stay cannot be considered a continuous variable, so the linear 
regression model should not be applied. Instead, it is better to use count data 
models that recognize that length of stay tends to take a limited set of quite low 
values with many patients having fairly short lengths of stay and relatively few 
staying for longer periods. Moreover, for some episodes of care, there might be a 
large proportion of patients who do not stay overnight (hence, being recorded as 
having a zero length of stay).  
 
 Determinants of hospital costs and performance variation 
 7 
The main count data models are the Poisson regression model and the negative 
binomial regression model, with the latter more likely to provide a better fit to the 
length-of-stay data that we will be examining. For episodes of care with a high 
proportion of zero values, the zero-inflated negative binomial model might be 
appropriate. Good introductions to count data models are provided by Cameron and 
Trivedi (1986), Long (1997) and Jones (2000). 
2.3 Analysis of hospital-level costs 
As mentioned, most empirical studies of hospital costs take the hospital as the unit 
of analysis, mainly because data are reported at this level of aggregation. This is 
problematic, however, because a common production function cannot be assumed. 
Potentially this renders analysis invalid, because hospitals cannot be considered 
comparable.  
When only kTC  is observed analysis of why some hospitals have different total costs 
than others involves specifying a cost function of the general form:  
1 1
N M
k k n k m k k
n m
TC Q X z      (6) 
Where kQ  measures the number of patients treated in hospital k. This number 
should be weighted in order to capture differences in (legitimate) costs; the most 
obvious choice for doing so – using DRG weights – has, however, the disadvantage of 
ex-ante accepting these weights as appropriate. There are the usual specification 
choices associated with estimating this function, such as whether to consider costs in 
natural units or in logarithmic form, and about the form in which explanatory 
variables appear. A review of these specification choices is included as section 2 of 
the Appendix. 
Note that it is a simple matter to convert equation (5) from a total cost function to 
an average cost function simply by dividing total costs by total activity: 
1 1
N M
k
k n k m k k
n mk
TC
AC
Q
X z      (7) 
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It is also possible to conduct efficiency analysis of hospital costs, using techniques 
such as stochastic frontier or data envelopment analysis (Jacobs et al. 2006). These 
techniques do not materially impact on the specification of the explanatory model, 
so we summarize these methods in Appendix 3.  
In specifications (6 & 7) the vector 
kX differs from the vector ikx  in the patient-level 
equation (1). Although the set of n variables are similar, rather being measured for 
each individual patient as in 
ikx , each variable in kX  is an aggregated summary of 
the patients in each hospital. For instance, rather than each patient’s age, age is 
specified as some summary (e.g. the average) of all patients in the hospital. It is 
evident, therefore, that hospital-level analysis makes use of much less information 
about patients than is available in the patient-level analysis. Consequently, the 
results are less robust.  
Note, however, that the vector of variables kmz  capturing hospital characteristics is 
common to the two forms of analysis.  
We now consider in more detail what variables are contained in these vectors. 
3 Explanatory factors 
3.1 Patient-level variables 
The over-riding reason that costs differ among patients is because they suffer from 
very different conditions. Diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) are designed to classify 
patients into mutually exclusive groups of patients, with the patients in each group 
having the same expected “legitimate” cost (whether this is actually the case will 
clearly depend on both the number of different DRGs used as well as the accuracy of 
defining them and calculating their relative weights). Countries have developed their 
own classification systems but, for expositional purposes, define a DRG as j , with 
1...j J . If DRGs capture all the variation in costs that are due to patient 
characteristics, it would be possible to analyse variation in the costs of patients in 
different hospitals by specifying a simple model of the general form: 
'
ik j ik k ikc β D  
       (8) 
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Where 
ikD  is a vector of dummy variables specifying the DRG to which the patient is 
allocated, 
ku  is variation in cost that is attributable to the hospital in which the 
patient is treated and 
ik
 captures random variation in patient costs.  
DRGs, though, cannot account for all variation in costs among patients – there will be 
other characteristics of patients other than their DRG and the hospital where they 
are treated that explain their costs.  
Some of these characteristics will be of general relevance, such as the patient’s age, 
gender or socio-economic status. Hvenegaard et al. (2009) consider the additional 
explanatory power, over and above that offered by the DRG classification, in 
explaining variation in the costs of patients undergoing vascular surgery. In this 
study, such variables prove to add little additional information. This is consistent 
with the health insurance literature, where age and gender explain little of the 
individual risk of incurring health expenditure. 
Other patient characteristics are more important, and are likely to vary according to 
the condition under consideration. For example Hvenegaard et al. (2009) consider a 
set of characteristics relevant to vascular patients including their smoking status, 
diabetes, and ASA score.  
The HealthBASKET project has explored in depth the relevance of diagnostics and 
treatment (on the patient level) as well as certain structural variables: For hip 
replacement, the choice of cemented vs. non-cemented hip implants as well as the 
number of hospital beds were significant explanatory factors (Stargardt 2008). For 
stroke, receiving thrombolysis and length of stay were significant explanatory 
variables (Epstein et al. 2008). For acute myocardial infarction (AMI), these were the 
use of PTCA and stenting, length of stay, and the setting (i.e. urban/rural) of the 
hospital (Tiemann 2008). For normal child delivery, the variables length of stay and 
labour costs for nurses/midwives were significant (Bellanger and Or 2008). For 
appendectomy, open surgery (vs. laparoscopic surgery) was associated with 
significantly lower costs, whereas a larger number of hospital beds led to higher 
costs (Schreyögg 2008). For cataract surgery, the number of minutes used for the 
intervention had the highest explanatory power (Fattore and Torbica 2008). Similarly 
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Laudicella et al. (2009) – besides patient variables such as birth weight and whether 
or not the baby was still-born – consider a range of diagnostic and procedural 
variables in their analysis of the costs of patients admitted to obstetrics specialties, 
together with a set of hospital variables specific to obstetrics, including the number 
of babies delivered.  
3.2 Hospital characteristics 
The choice about what hospital characteristics, kmz , to take into account depends on 
the purpose or perspective of the analysis. Broadly, the literature can be divided into 
two camps: technological functions derived from the theory of the firm and so-called 
behavioural functions designed to control for the exogenous constraints that 
prohibit cost minimization among hospitals.  
A standard neo-classical framework involves explaining costs in relation to the level 
of production (e.g. number of patients treated) and the price of different inputs – 
notably labour, equipment and capital. If the research interest is in analysing costs 
from the perspective of hospitals themselves, this framework might be appropriate. 
The explanatory variables measure the input choices made by – or endogenous to - 
the hospitals themselves. 
Early studies of hospital costs specified a behavioural function in a somewhat ad hoc 
manner, including “fairly indiscriminately all variables for which a causal relationship 
to hospital costs is hypothesized and data are available” (Breyer 1987). But recently 
more thought has gone into the specification, in recognition that, in most public 
health systems, some hospitals are required to operate in more adverse 
circumstances than others. These circumstances are often termed “environmental 
factors” and make achievement of a given level of cost more difficult. In effect these 
factors constrain the hospital from operating on the technically feasible minimum 
cost frontier.  
The analytical objective is to control for these constraining factors in comparing costs 
between hospitals. This involves identifying a set of variables that reflects feasible 
production possibilities within a constrained environment (Smith 1981). There is 
often considerable debate as to what factors are considered constraints. In the short 
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run, many factors are outside the control of hospitals. In the longer term a broader 
set of factors is potentially under hospital control, but the extent and nature of this 
control will vary depending on the nature of the context. 
In what follows, we consider in more detail the type of variables that might be 
incorporated in the vector 
kmz .  
3.2.1 Teaching status 
Teaching hospitals are often thought to have higher costs than non-teaching 
hospitals. There have been numerous studies devoted to estimating the cost 
differential and almost all econometric analyses of hospital costs include teaching 
status as a dummy variable. We do not attempt an exhaustive summary of this 
empirical research, except to say that the literature rarely explains why costs might 
differ in these two types of institution. There are two main explanations of 
differential costs. 
The first reason is not to do with the teaching function of the hospital per se, but to 
perceived inadequacies in DRG system. Teaching hospitals are thought to treat 
patients of a greater severity than non-teaching hospitals. In theory, the DRG system 
should be able to account for these differences. In practice, the classification may be 
imperfect. If teaching hospitals systematically attract more severe patients within 
each DRG, their costs will be higher. So the “teaching status” variable is simply 
picking up additional patient heterogeneity, rather than it having anything to do with 
the teaching function itself. 
The second reason is due to how teaching is funded. As part of their training medical 
students are required to accompany consultants around the hospital in order to 
observe and treat patients. Thus the provision of teaching may introduce delays to 
the treatment process if, say, consultants spend longer reviewing each patient prior 
to surgery or prior to discharge so that the medical students can learn from the 
review process. In essence, the provision of patient care and medical education is a 
joint and complementary process and it is not straightforward to disentangle these 
two components. 
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If funding fails to determine accurately the costs of teaching, the error will be 
captured by the “teaching status” variable in the analysis of patient-related hospital 
costs. In contexts where medical education is underfunded relative to patient care, 
teaching hospitals will have higher costs than non-teaching hospitals. In other 
contexts, funding for medical education might be more generous, to the extent that 
it subsidizes the provision of patient care. In such circumstances, costs of treatment 
in teaching hospitals will appear lower than in non-teaching hospitals. 
3.2.2 Ownership 
The famous question of whether “there is a dime’s worth of difference” (Sloan et al. 
2001) between the performance of for-profit and not-for-profit or public and private 
hospitals has yet to be solved. Many theoretical and empirical investigations have 
examined differences with regard to organizational goals, behaviour and outcomes. 
Econometric analyses tend to include ownership as a dummy variable either being 
specified as private versus public or as for-profit versus not-for-profit (in the 
following we will refer only to for-profit and not-for-profit differences as the 
arguments for both taxonomies are very similar). As for teaching status, we do not 
attempt to summarize the findings of all existing studies, but rather focus on the 
implicit conceptual underpinnings, which are rarely spelled out explicitly. 
There are two main predictions with regard to cost differences between for-profit 
and not-for-profit. The first argues that for-profit hospitals operate at lower costs 
and are more efficient than not-for-profit ones. The second argues the opposite: not-
for-profit hospitals operate at lower cost per case.  
Three main reasons are put forward to explain why for-profit hospitals should 
operate at lower costs. (1) The property rights model suggests that for-profit 
hospitals produce at lower costs as well-established control rights provide owners 
with a higher propensity to invest in cost-cutting innovations since they stand to gain 
personally from the resulting profits. (2) It is argued that in public and not-for-profit 
hospitals the lack of monitoring by private owners and capital markets means that 
managers are less tightly controlled and therefore have more opportunities to shirk. 
(3) Related but slightly different is the argument that quality and institutional 
reputation in the community rather than profit maximization are predominant 
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principles for evaluating managers in the public sector and these determine 
managers’ career advancement. As a consequence managers in public and not-for-
profit hospitals face strong incentives to invest time and resources to maximize 
reputation enhancing technologies or representative infrastructure rather than 
focusing on profits or efficiency.  
The second prediction, based on a number of empirical observations including 
systematic reviews and meta-analyses (Hollingsworth 2003; Vaillancourt 2003) , is 
that “public rather than private provision of health care seems more efficient for 
hospitals” (Hollingsworth 2008). Building on a mixture of theoretical and empirical 
findings, this strand of the literature argues that the finding of “higher profits” 
among for-profit hospitals are neither due to true costs nor due to ownership 
structure per se. Rather they are due to not-for-profit hospitals systematically 
attracting more complex or severe patients and of the inadequacy of DRGs to reflect 
actual costs and greater (unobserved) severity of these patients. In such 
circumstances, costs of treatment in not-for-profit hospitals will appear higher than 
in for-profit hospitals. Accounting for these imperfections reveals that public 
hospitals operate at least as efficiently as they have no ability or incentives to cherry-
pick less complex patients.  
Contract failure models add that as the quality and adequacy health care services are 
hard to determine for patients (Hansmann 1980) as health care markets are 
characterized by information asymmetry in favour of suppliers, i.e. hospitals. In this 
framework, for-profit hospitals face incentives to increase profit at the cost of lower 
quality of care, while not-for-profit hospitals, being characterized by a 
nondistribution constraint, have no incentive to lower quality in favour of profits 
(Wörz 2008: 37-38). As a consequence this set of models predict that revenue and 
profits are higher in for-profit hospitals while efficiency (if taking account of quality 
when measuring costs or ideally being measured in terms of health outcomes) will 
be lower. There is empirical evidence from a meta-analysis supporting this view 
(Devereaux et al. 2002). 
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Institutional approaches further stress that hospitals with different ownership 
regimes may have different costs because they are subject to different taxation 
regimes, may have different access to capital, may have differential influence on 
labour costs, their location of production, or the amount of (inadequately 
compensated) emergency care provided (Mason et al. 2008a). Whether these 
circumstances mean that for-profit or not-for-profit hospitals produce at higher cost 
then depends on the context specific configurations of the regulatory framework.  
In contexts where patient and organizational variables fail to adequately reflect 
differences in factors constraining the behaviour of for-profit and not-for profit 
hospitals, the error will be captured by the dummy variable “ownership status”. 
If for-profit hospital face a less constraining environment or benefit from more 
effective incentive structures relative to not-for-profit hospitals, for-profit hospitals 
will have lower costs than not-for-profit hospitals. If not-for-profit hospitals face a 
more favourable regulatory environment (e.g. generous tax breaks) relative to for-
profit hospitals, not-for-profit hospitals will have lower costs than for-profits.  
3.2.3 Volume of activity: economies of scale 
Larger hospitals or units are often thought to produce at lower costs than smaller 
hospitals or units. The basic argument is that larger hospitals or units benefit from 
economies of scale, experiencing decreasing costs per output as volume increases. 
Larger hospitals or units might produce at lower cost due to the following reasons: 
specialized equipment often comes in units of some minimum size, so that larger 
output makes usage more efficient. Benefits from division of labour may arise 
because larger workforce facilitates restricting the range of services performed by 
each individual worker allowing for standardization. Also a larger workforce and 
technological infrastructure may allow compensating more easily for illnesses or 
departure of workers or technological problems.  
Beyond a particular size, diseconomies of scale may arise, perhaps because a larger 
hospital or unit size leads to overly high expenditures for overhead, bureaucratic 
forms of organization, complex interdependencies implying problems of 
coordination and cooperation.  
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There have been numerous studies devoted to these issues, e.g. (Posnett 2002) and 
almost all econometric analyses of hospital costs include some measure of size as a 
dummy variable. To scrutinize the effect to different hospital sizes one can include 
the number of patients (e.g. in thousands) treated in hospital or department j in the 
model. These outlined arguments may also be consistently formulated to justify a 
variable that captures the volume of a specific episode of care. Hence one should 
add a variable that measures the number of patients falling in the definition of the 
respective episode of care treated in the hospital or department j measuring volume 
by episode of care.  
If one of the respective variables is positive, this suggests that average costs after 
controlling for patient characteristics are higher in large departments or hospitals or 
in departments producing more of the services relevant to the respective episode of 
care. Additionally, a measure for the number of whole time equivalent general or 
specialist physician per 100 patients can be incorporated if reported. Different job 
and staff categories can be weighted according to their respective wages.  
Whether size should be considered truly environmental factors depends to on the 
regulatory context. In some countries as in Germany hospital capacity is negotiated 
between state-level regulators and hospital management and then fixed for a certain 
period of time. Hence, in the short-run capacity, is exogenous, while in the long run 
it might be adjusted.  
3.2.4 Range of activity: specialization versus economies of scope 
The range of activity offered by the hospital may also influence costs, but it is 
difficult to predict the direction of influence. On the one hand, if there are 
economies of scope, increasing the range of activity leads to lower costs. Economies 
of scope refer to a situation in which the joint production of two or more products 
can be achieved at lower costs than the combined cost of producing each product 
individually. General hospitals offering a wide range of services may produce at 
lower costs in circumstances in which the production of different but related outputs 
jointly is cheaper than the production of outputs separately (Panzar and Willig 1981). 
These cost advantages can be generated through shared use of resources such as 
technology, workers, or general overhead such as spreading fix costs of operating 
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rooms or intensive care units over multiple different but related operations. So, for 
example, it might be less expensive to situate the accident and emergency 
department, fracture clinic, and trauma and orthopaedic wards in close proximity 
rather than having them in different locations, as this means that equipment be 
shared and staff in different departments can work more effectively together 
particularly when patients need to transferred between each setting. 
On the other hand, it is often argued that hospitals which specialize have lower costs 
than general hospitals (Dranove 1987). One reason for specialization is to protect or 
ring-fence resources for specific purposes, when otherwise there would be 
competing claims on their use (Harris 1977; Kjekshus and Hagen 2005; Street et al. 
2009). Another argument is that specialization allows expertise to develop and 
flourish. Specialist hospitals may be better at evaluating practice over a more limited 
range of activities and clinical outcomes have been shown improve as doctors 
undertake more of the same procedure.  
To analyse the effect of different range of services the number of specialties offered 
in a hospital can be used as a proxy. If positive, this variable would suggest that 
average costs after controlling for patient characteristics are higher in hospitals with 
more specialities. Another approach is to define a specialization index, capturing the 
distribution of activity across DRGs (Daidone and D'Amico 2009). In a similar vein, 
Laudicella et al. (2009: 8) include variables that measure the amount of neonatal and 
antenatal care as a proportion of all activity in the obstetrics department. 
3.2.5 Quality 
One reason that costs may differ among hospitals is that their quality differs. The 
relationship between quality and costs, however, is unclear. As outlined in the 
section on ownership, some models envisage that higher quality implies higher 
resource consumption, while other models suggest that higher quality can lead to 
more efficient delivery of hospital care (Wörz 2008). Moreover, the relationship 
between quality and ownership is a frequent issue (Currie et al. 2003; Devereaux et 
al. 2002; Vaillancourt 2003). However, the evidence is inconclusive with regard the 
conduciveness of different forms of ownership on quality.  
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For the analyses in the EuroDRG project it is moreover important to consider that 
quality is multi-dimensional and difficult to measure as it is difficult to establish both 
the direction and degree of influence of quality on costs. 
Preferably measures of quality will be available for each patient, in which case 
influence can be established by including the measures in the 
ikx  vector of variables 
explaining patient costs in equation (3). Various measures of quality can be 
considered including waiting times, in-hospital or 30-day mortality, infections, 
readmissions, and changes in health status. 
In the absence of patient-level measures of quality, some studies describe the 
process of care delivery or structure of the department or hospital in which care is 
delivered. These measures might describe, say, whether clinical guidelines have been 
adopted, the staffing complement, or the availability of particular types of 
equipment (see section 3.2.6). Whatever the measure, there is an assumption that 
investment in process or structural dimensions of quality is positively correlated with 
the quality of care delivered to individual patients.  
3.2.6 Technological equipment 
The relationship between hospital costs and technological equipment has been on 
the research agenda for several decades. Many of the investigations were and some 
are still inspired by the idea of non-price competition among hospitals (Joskow 1983; 
Luft et al. 1986). The latter argue that, as in most western health systems patients 
are not sensitive to hospital prices (since they are insured) and the quality of care 
delivered tends to be hard to judge, hospitals can feel motivated to (over-) invest in 
“high technology” as a competitive strategy to attract (profitable) patients. This may 
result in a “medical arms race”, which can cause higher hospital expenditure and 
may increase costs per case.  
At the same time it has been stressed that technology investments in hospitals may 
encompass product, process and organizational innovation that can be hypothesized 
to influence hospitals in very different ways (Zweifel and Breyer 1997). Technological 
equipment may increase total costs per case but may also decrease total costs per 
case. Similarly process and organizational innovation can be hypothesized to 
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increase or decrease costs per case. Given the theoretical background it seems to be 
hard to justify any general statement about the expected relationship between 
hospital costs and technology or technical equipment.  
The multidimensional character of technology is one of the reasons why general 
technological indices - in its simplest form the sum of the number of services each 
hospital offers from a list of possible services - are criticized as they are not able to 
account for the heterogeneity of technology (Spetz and Maiuro 2004). Moreover, an 
underlying hypothesis suggesting a specific relation between technology on the one 
side and hospital costs on the other side can hardly be specified, which undermines 
well-grounded modelling.  
A common alternative is the use of specific technology indices, which are modelled 
from a vector of known efficacious technologies at the level of the hospital (Pitterle 
et al. 1994; Prince 1998). However, also the use of this category of explanatory 
variables is problematic when used to explain cost variation between hospitals. The 
main reason is that technologies or technological equipment to be included are 
commonly selected in a more or less arbitrary way, while at the same time empirical 
studies confirms that variable omission and variable selection with regard to hospital 
technology substantially affect the results of parametric hospital cost functions 
(Cremieux and Ouellette 2001).   
The episode of care approach seems well suited to avoid the main drawbacks of the 
outlined approaches. Firstly, as the costs of specific indications or are to be 
explained, the range of technologies and technological equipment to be considered 
is limited and decisions for including certain types of technical equipment can be 
more readily justified by reference to the treatment patterns of the episode at hand. 
The arbitrariness of the variable selection seems hence less problematic – though it 
remains a matter of degree. Moreover, practical experience within hospitals and 
episode specific costing studies may be used to formulate well-grounded hypotheses 
about the relationship between specific types of technical equipment and hospital 
costs. This makes it easier to justify the inclusion of specific variables approximating 
technological equipment during the modelling process.  
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To scrutinize the effect of diverging sets of technological equipment on hospital 
costs, dummy variables for the existence of e.g. a catheter laboratory, a stroke unit 
or a neonatal intensive care unit could be included in the model.   
3.2.7 Geographical variation in input costs 
Other factors that make the achievement of a given level of cost or production more 
difficult are geographical variations in input costs. So far the empirical evidence 
about the significance of differences in input costs is limited and only few DRG 
systems attempt to adjust reimbursement for geographical variation. Policy 
examples are the US Medicare wage index, which adjusts for differences in hospital 
wage levels by a factor reflecting the relative hospital wage level in the geographic 
area of the hospital compared to the US-wide average hospital wage level (Centre 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2007) and the English “Payment by Results” 
(PbR) where public hospitals receive additional payments to account for 
geographical variations in the costs of land, buildings and staff through the so-called 
Market Forces Factor (MFF) (Mason et al. 2008b). 
The reason for accounting for input cost differentials across hospitals when 
comparing cost per episode of care is that most public hospitals cannot locate where 
they wish and therefore need to pay local factor prices rather than relocating to 
areas with lower costs. As a result, hospitals face locational constraints, which are 
outside their control and affect their production costs (Mason et al. 2008b) 
To account for differences in wage levels beyond the control of hospitals one can 
adjust labour costs of each hospital by a scaling factor that represents variation in 
total (or average) costs due local labour market constrains. One way to do this is to 
divide the average compensation per hour in the hospital’s labour market (local, 
regional or state) by the average compensation per hour in the country. Contingent 
upon data availability the former can be performed for various job categories and 
summarized in a weighted index. The raw adjustor can then be multiplied by the 
hospital’s percentage of total costs attributable to salaries to determine final 
adjustors. Ultimately final adjustors with scores of less than 1.0 indicate low cost 
labour markets and those greater than 1.0 indicate high cost labour markets. For 
example, a hospital with an adjustor of 1.054 is expected to have total costs 5.4% 
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above the country average due to higher labour costs in its labour market. Similarly, 
a hospital with an adjustor of 0.98 is expected to experience 2% lower total costs 
due to the local labour market environment. Each hospital’s costs per episode of 
care can then be adjusted accordingly. The respective variable in the regression 
captures differences in the labour prices faced by hospitals in different regions which 
are beyond their control.  
Using similar approach, differences in capital and building costs can be captured 
across regions and countries provided that data requirements can be met.  
3.2.8 Geographical location 
It is common in many empirical analyses to include dummy variables that identify 
the location of the hospital. These might identify the geographical area or indicate 
whether the hospital is located in an urban or rural setting. The interpretation of the 
variables identifying geographical area will, of course, be country-specific. 
In some contexts rural hospitals might have higher costs than urban hospitals. For 
example, when DRG funding was first introduced in the Australian state of Victoria 
rural hospitals received additional payments (Duckett 1994). There were two 
reasons for this. First, they were thought to face above ambulance and patient 
transport costs simply because they were transporting patients over longer 
distances. Second, because they were serving small communities rural hospitals 
were less likely to treat sufficient number of patients to achieve economies of scale. 
The payment, then, was justified to ensure access to health services for isolated 
communities. 
In other contexts urban hospitals might appear to have higher costs than their rural 
counterparts. This might be because either they attract patients of above-average 
complexity and this is inadequately reflected by the DRG system or they face higher 
input prices which have not been adequately accounted for (see preceding section). 
It is difficult, though, to see why urban status per se drives higher costs. Rather the 
variable is likely to capture measurement error in other variables, particularly patient 
case-mix, hospital size and scope, and geographical variation in input prices. 
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Appendix 
 
1 Examining hospital performance – the nature of the 
problem 
 
It is often asserted that health care organizations face limited competitive pressures 
that would otherwise encourage them to innovate and adopt cost minimizing 
behaviour. There are various grounds for making this assertion. For instance, 
competitive behaviour may be less in evidence if health care is publicly 
funded/provided or in situations where health care organizations enjoy a 
geographical or specialist monopoly of supply. If competitive pressure is weak, there 
may be scope for better utilization of resources. At the same time common 
performance measures such as return on investment (ROI) or profitability seem 
inappropriate due to the fact that health care entities are often public or non-for 
profit and therefore do not have to generate profits or returns to investments.  
Different classes of models are used by health economists to derive insights about 
hospital performance. Firstly, researchers use models, which attempt to explicitly 
model the production process in hospitals and compare (average or total) cost 
across hospitals. This group of models builds mainly on neoclassical microeconomic 
theory and produced rich and diverse sets of studies. Most popular approaches 
include hospital cost function (HCF) analysis operationalized via ordinary least 
squares (OLS) or corrected ordinary least squares (COLS) regression techniques. 
These were the main approaches during the 1980s and 1990s to derive insights 
about the hospital costs, scale and scope, as well as productivity and efficiency. Over 
the last decade the attention of most researchers shifted to performance analysis. 
Performance analyses aim to identify which organizations are doing better than 
others in either their overall operation or in specific areas of operation. This 
information may be used to stimulate better use of resources, either by encouraging 
organizations to act of their own volition or through the imposition of tailored 
incentives by a regulatory authority or funding agency.  
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Here the concept of efficiency is applied to consider the relative performance of 
organizations engaged in production, converting inputs into outputs. The 
fundamental building block of efficiency analysis is the production function. The 
production function models the maximum output an organization could secure, 
given its level and mix of inputs. In very simple terms, the production process can be 
pictured as in the diagram below. The organization employs inputs (labour, capital, 
equipment, etc) and converts these into some sort of output. The middle box, where 
this production process takes place, is critical to whether some organizations are 
better than others at converting inputs into output.  
 
Labour, intermediate 
and capital inputs 
→ 
Organization of the 
production process 
→ Outputs 
 
The middle box is actually something of a ´black box´ because it is usually very 
difficult for outsiders to observe what goes on in the organization and how its 
production process is organized. Indeed, in some industries (such as the 
pharmaceutical sector) the production process might be a closely guarded secret and 
the source of competitive advantage. 
This inability to observe the production process directly is a fundamental challenge 
for those seeking to analyse efficiency. Nevertheless, it is possible to think of a gold 
standard production process that describes the best possible way of organizing 
production, given the prevailing technology. This gold standard is termed the 
“production frontier”, where the amount and combination of inputs is optimal. Any 
other scale of operation or input mix would secure a lower ratio of output to input. 
Organizations that have adopted this gold standard are efficient – they are operating 
at the frontier of the prevailing technological process. But organizations might be 
operating some way short of this gold standard: equipment might be outmoded, 
staff may be given to shirking, capital resources might stand idle periodically. These, 
and multiple other reasons, might explain inefficiency. To assess whether there is 
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better scope for utilization of resources, insight can be gained by comparing 
organizations involved in similar activities. Rather than attempting to prise open the 
“black box”, such comparative analysis concentrates on the extremes depicted in the 
diagram. Information about what goes in (inputs to the production process) and 
what comes out (outputs of the production process) allows comparison of input-
output combinations of organizations that produce similar things. If an organization 
uses less input to produce one unit of output than another organization, the former 
is more productive. If we want to assess organizations that produce different 
amounts of output, we need to make judgements about whether there are 
economies of scale which, in turn, relies on understanding the gold standard 
production process. Organizations can then be judged in terms of their relative 
efficiency.  
2 Specification choices (in parametric analysis of hospital 
costs and performance) 
 
We concentrate on specifications choices to be made in the context of the 
parametric approaches such as hospital cost functions and the Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) as these will be used in the EuroDRG project. Similar choices also have 
to be made in the context of the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). However, as the 
EuroDRG project will not apply these we only briefly introduce the DEA in very 
general terms in section 3 of the appendix and for the complexities of specification 
choices refer to the excellent introduction in Jacobs et al. (2006: 91ff).  
2.1 Transformation of variables 
One of the first choices researchers face is the form in which they incorporate 
variables in their model. Using variables in their natural units implies the assumption 
that the explanatory variables are related linearly to the dependent variable (Jacobs 
et al. 2006: 43). This approach assumes a constant rate of change in costs as the 
scale of activity changes. This assumption may not hold in practice as decreasing 
returns to scale or increasing returns to scale or scope can imply variable marginal 
cost. Taking logarithms of the variables in the model represents a way to model non-
linear relationships. In this case, the interpretations of coefficients changes from 
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natural units to percentage changes or elasticities. Other functional forms such as 
including higher–order powers of explanatory variables can also be applied. Their 
appropriateness can be scrutinized by applying a t-test.  
2.2 Total vs. average cost function 
The choice between estimating average and total cost functions depends to a large 
extent on the purpose and focus of the analysis. Conceptually economic models 
suggest that organizations can change their output or cost level in two ways: a) by 
making proportionate changes to the amount of all inputs used in the production 
process and b) by changing the composition of the input mix.  
The effect of changing input composition depends on the scale properties of the 
function (also called the degree of homogeneity). If the function is homogeneous of 
degree 1, i.e. linearly homogenous, a proportionate change in use of input leads to a 
change of output by the same proportion. Under this condition of constant returns 
to scale, an average and a total cost function yield equivalent results (Jacobs et al. 
2006: 45).  
From a statistical point of view estimating an average function is preferable if the 
data being analysed are subject to heteroscedasticity, i.e. if the variance of the 
residual is not constant. The latter can be reduced by using an average cost function 
for the model or by estimating the ratio of output or cost to a deflating variable, 
where the residual is more likely to display homoscedasticity (Intriligator 1978). The 
disadvantage of using the ratio of output or cost to deflating variable is that there no 
statistical criteria to guide the selection of the deflating variable. One option is to 
making the dependent variable an average cost per unit of size. However, this 
approach is only appropriate in the case of constant returns to scale. Alternatively, 
one can deflate on an output – but in the context of multiple outputs the choice of 
the output for deflation substantially affects the estimates.  
Before deflating a total cost function one should test for heteroscedasticity because 
the error term is transformed by deflation (Kuh and Meyer 1955). In addition, new 
bias may be entered by deflation if the variable used for deflation is multicollinear 
with one of the explanatory variables (Kuh and Meyer 1955). Total cost functions 
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have the advantage of incorporating various types of output. Other approaches to 
deal with heteroscedasticity than estimating an average cost function in this context 
are estimating a logarithmic function (Maddala 1988) or using a robust estimator 
(White 1980).  
2.3 Functional form 
Various authors showed that the choice of the functional form of the production or 
cost function substantially affects the results of hospital cost or performance analysis 
(Folland and Hofler 2001; Rosko and Mutter 2008; Smet 2002; Street 2003). The two 
most common functional forms in parametric analyses are ad-hoc specifications and 
specifications, which in principal are informed by neo-classical propositions but 
accept assumptions to very different degrees. We will briefly outline the main 
features and implications of these in the following paragraphs.  
(1) The most basic functional form are ad-hoc specifications, which intend to explain 
variations in costs per unit of output among hospitals. As indicators for output these 
early studies used mainly cost per case or cost per patient and as explanatory 
variables they included “fairly indiscriminately all variables for which a causal 
relationship to hospital costs is hypothesized and data are available” (Breyer 1987). 
The underlying explanatory model assumes that the cost determinants are linear and 
additively separable and are specified in an additive-linear functional form. These 
assumptions may not hold in practice. The additive-linear model for example would 
imply that an additional bed in the hospital raises costs by a fixed amount – 
independent of other factors such as hospital’s utilization, the spectrum of illnesses 
treatment or wage levels in the hospital. 
The main advantage of this rather bold approach is that it can deal with the multi-
product nature of hospitals, while keeping the number of variables manageable 
(Smet 2002). However, this strength comes at a cost – non-separable relationships 
between patient, organizational and or environmental variables cannot be 
accounted for and therefore estimates suffer from limited explanatory scope and 
power. While this form of hospital cost functions had considerable impact on public 
policy in the US and in the UK during the 1980s (Street 2003), most researchers 
recently concentrate on more flexible models.  
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(2) The second group – approaches following neoclassical proposition – enable 
researchers to investigate the variance of output following changes in the level or 
mix of inputs. Independent variables in this framework are inputs under the control 
of hospital managers. Within this group different approaches can be identified which 
accept various sets of restrictions with different implications. One can distinguish 
between (2a) closed functional form, (2b) flexible functional form and (2c) hybrid 
flexible functional form cost functions.  
(2a) Closed functional form cost functions accept a large set of common but rather 
restrictive assumption used in neo-classical economics (Conrad and Strauss 1983; 
Cowing et al. 1983). These models, which we called “technological” cost functions in 
the first part of the review, build on the insights of duality theory (Shepard 1970) 
suggesting a one-to-one correspondence between production und cost function 
(Breyer 1987) and also implying a cost function which is non-decreasing and 
homogeneous of degree one in factor prices (Caves et al. 1980). A common form is 
the well-known Cobb-Douglas logarithmic form:  
 /ln     (1) 
 
where: 
 = total output 
 = technology 
 = labour 
 = capital 
 and  positive parameters 
 
The logarithmic form allows these parameters to be interpreted as elasticities. This 
approach entails relatively high risks of misspecification, since researchers often feel 
that they can hardly specify the true cost function. Moreover, the strict version of 
this approach requires that only factor input prices and quantities are incorporated 
as explanatory variables. The influence of structural variables such as market 
characteristics, and patient characteristics cannot be scrutinized. Hence, the 
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estimates may be biased given that the underlying model disregards exogenous 
factors (Breyer 1987). Consequently, this group of hospital cost functions is hardly 
able to derive meaningful insight about potential “legitimate” hospital cost variation.  
(2b) To circumvent these problems and to avoid misspecification, flexible functional 
forms, which try to approximate the true functional form using techniques such as 
local second-order Taylor approximation, were developed (Smet 2002). Thereby the 
main problems of both the ad-hoc and the strict neoclassical approaches are 
circumvented, i.e. the deterministic approach towards the relationship between the 
variables in the model. Most common variants of flexible functional forms are the 
quadratic, the transcendental (translog) and the generalized transcendental 
functional form. However, these models face other difficulties: due to their technical 
form they can no longer handle large number of outputs such as different cases or 
patients categories (Smet 2002). Moreover, the limited range of outputs that cost 
functions in this group can handle generates additional drawbacks. Calculating 
economies of scope and scale, i.e. deriving inputs about decreasing marginal cost as 
output levels increase or returns from specialization require that the function is 
scrutinized at the level of (multiple) outputs and not in the neighbourhood of 
approximations. Moreover, to estimate economies of scope and scale information 
about incremental costs is required. Since flexible functional form specifications 
need to reduce the number of outputs in the model, they often operate on the basis 
of some aggregate measure of output such as average or total costs. Since average 
and total cost functions fail to provide information about incremental costs and costs 
at zero output level respectively, their use precludes analyzing issues such as 
economies of scale and scope.  
(2c) Hybrid functional form hospital cost functions allow relaxing some neoclassical 
assumptions, while still operating within the neoclassical framework. For example 
using hybrid functional forms allows supplementing factors of production as 
explanatory variables by other variables representing organizational constrains. 
Hence, the impact of other exogenous factors on performance and cost variation can 
be scrutinized, while the basic assumption of homogeneity in factor prices is 
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maintained. These variables are not interpreted as contributing to the cost 
minimum, but rather explain deviations of observed costs from cost minimization. 
Overall, we face an ambiguous trade-off: either to prioritize flexibility of the 
functional form and less restrictive assumptions with regard to nature of 
organizational and market characteristics or to focus on the ability of the model to 
account for the multi-product nature of hospitals. Increasingly, ad hoc specifications 
and closed functional forms are being considered of limited value due to restrictive 
assumptions and over simplistic specification. Flexible functional and hybrid forms 
represent the majority of recent applications (Rosko and Mutter 2008; Smet 2002; 
Street 2003). 
Vignettes or episode approach such as used in the EuroDRG project constitute a 
third option that captures the benefits of flexible functional forms while not 
suffering from artificially ignoring the multi-product nature of hospitals.  
2.4 Input variables 
Most parametric analysis of hospital costs build explicitly or implicitly on a neo-
classical model of the production process. In this framework factor markets are 
assumed to be competitive and free from monistic pressures (Smet 2002). Hence, 
hospital managers face given prices and can solely decide on the mix of inputs, the 
scale of input use and their application in the production process. Reliable price data 
for inputs, however, are often hard to collect or simply not available. Therefore, 
researchers often simply omit input prices in their models. This approach implies the 
assumption that input prices are identical across hospitals included in the sample or 
that the substitution rate for hospital technology is zero (Cowing et al. 1983). As a 
consequence, insights about the effects of differences in input prices, such as 
different wage levels, capital costs or differences in the cost of medical technology 
across hospitals, cannot be generated. Moreover, as we saw earlier the application 
of the strict neoclassical model implies that the hospital cost function is homothetic. 
Given the high degree of restrictiveness of these assumptions, recent analyses often 
relaxed the former and incorporated input prices in the model in the framework of 
more flexible functional forms.  
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Another central issue when considering the input side is, how inputs are 
disaggregated (Jacobs et al. 2006). Studies vary to a great extent with regard to the 
level of disaggregation: some studies use aggregate costs, while others try to 
disaggregate all relevant inputs. This variation of practice reflects on the one hand 
differences in the availability of data for input prices and quantities. On the other 
hand, choices with regard to the level of disaggregation also co-determine the focus 
of the analysis. Using total costs as the single measure of inputs implies the 
assumption that hospitals can deploy inputs freely without external constrains. This 
approach hence takes a long term perspective, assuming that hospitals can adopt an 
optimal mix of capital and labour. Disaggregation comes at the cost that models 
become less parsimonious, which captures some of the explanatory power of those 
factors in the production for which weighting is less clear (Jacobs et al. 2006: 30). 
Commonly disaggregated inputs are labour and capital. An important additional 
aspect is to account for services that hospitals have outsourced.  
2.5 Outputs 
As the model of the production process is the starting point of all analyses of 
hospital costs good measures for output are essential. Nevertheless, it is well known 
that defining outputs is problematic in the health sector, as health care is rarely 
demanded for its own sake but rather due to its positive contribution to health 
status. Given this background, hospital output should ideally be measured in terms 
of health outcomes. However, health outcomes are hard to measure and rarely 
systematically collected by hospitals. Researchers therefore tend to use activity 
indicators such as the number of cases treated, the number of hospital days per 
organization or the number of procedures performed as approximations for output. 
Using these indicators suffers from various limitations: 
(1) Firstly, hospitals generating better health outcomes with less activity, for 
example by developing smart medical pathways are penalized. However, the 
quality of the services is hard to measure and therefore hard to incorporate in 
production or cost functions (Jacobs et al. 2006: 28).  
(2) Secondly, given the multi-product nature of hospitals, the relative value or 
weight of each output has to be specified.  
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As we will see below in the sub-section on weights (2.7), parametric analyses tend to 
implicitly assume that the expenditure allocation within the hospital reflects societal 
values of different outputs, which might be questionable. Moreover, in the neo-
classical production framework the level of output should be completely beyond the 
control of the hospital managers and physicians, i.e. exogenous. This assumption has 
been challenged from two angles:  
(1) Firstly, it has been argued that hospital managers may manipulate the supply 
side by producing more if their hospital is characterized by a favourable cost 
structure or less if the opposite is the case. 
 (2) Secondly, many studies argue that physicians may induce demand, operating 
exogenous to the decisions of hospital management.  
In both cases, estimates generated by a model that does not account for the former 
are biased. Nevertheless, exogenous determination of levels of output is often 
assumed given that case payment systems and the cost containment pressure by 
third-party payers weakened the relationship between gross-price charged and the 
quantity demanded (Smet 2002). Still, one of the defining features of well-suited 
models to determine hospital performance or sources of cost variation is that they 
incorporate well-designed measures of output and that they are capable to account 
for output being determined (partially) within hospitals via econometric techniques 
such as instrumental variables (Smet 2002).  
2.6 Environmental variables 
Any analysis of hospital costs needs to clarify how it approaches factors that 
constrain the production of health care. There is often considerable debate as to 
what factors should be considered constraints. In the short run, many factors are 
outside the control of the organizations and could be considered “legitimate” factors 
of variation. In the long-term a broader set of factors is potentially under the control 
of the organizations, but the extent and nature of this control will vary depending on 
the nature of the context.  
Therefore the assumptions with regard to the equilibrium condition, i.e. the state 
(long- vs. short-term) in which managers can determine the level of all inputs, are 
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important. Some authors assume that hospital managers are essentially able to set 
all inputs at the cost-minimizing level, include a price for capital and therefore 
estimate a long-run cost function. Others argue that only easily adjustable inputs can 
be employed at the cost-minimization level and estimate short run cost functions 
(Smet 2002).  
Econometric techniques offer some orientation by providing tools to test whether 
hospitals operate in short or long run equilibrium using the so-called envelope 
condition (Braeutigam and Daughety 1983). The latter, however, can only be 
performed with reliable and detailed data for inputs, which are often not available. 
Estimating a long-run hospital cost function without testing the appropriateness of 
the long-term equilibrium assumption may lead to biased estimates and 
misspecification of functional form. Most researchers therefore agree that in the 
absence of high quality measures of capital input, short-run hospital cost functions 
should be estimated (Cowing et al. 1983; Smet 2002; Vita 1990). 
Having agreed on the priority given to short-run models, one needs to consider how 
to incorporate those factors, which are beyond the control of hospital mangers in 
the analysis. In the framework of the parametric analyses there are three main ways 
to account for environmental variables: 
- Firstly, comparisons can be restricted to hospitals operating within similarly 
constrained environments (Everitt et al. 2001).  
- Secondly, external constrains can be included directly as explanatory 
variables in the production model.  
- Thirdly, risk adjustment techniques adjust organizational output for 
differences in constrains before they are deployed in the efficiency model 
(Jacobs et al. 2006: 35). In the light of the multi-product nature of hospitals 
this approach is often considered superior to the other approaches, since it 
adjusts each output only for those constrains that apply specifically rather 
than adjusting all outputs generally for external constrains.  
 
Risk adjustment to account for the fact that output is heterogeneous with regard to 
certain dimensions is often operationalized via product mix descriptor variables, 
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which can be grouped into three broad categories: (1) case-mix complexity, (2) 
quality, and (3) intra-diagnosis related group severity of illness (Rosko and Mutter 
2008). While contributing to avoid specification bias, the use of product descriptor 
variables has three additional global effects, which need to be taken into account. 
Firstly, the addition of further explanatory variables is always likely to lead to a 
decline of the previously unexplained residual and thereby to reduce estimated 
average inefficiency or cost variation (Jacobs et al. 2006). However, it reduces 
parsimony and adds uncertainty with regard to the results. Finally, the data 
requirements for risk adjustment are demanding and some controversy exists about 
appropriate techniques (Jacobs et al. 2006: 36).  
2.7 Weights 
A key aspect, which policy makers need to consider when scrutinizing cost and 
output variation across individual or groups of organizations, is whether all 
organizations are meant to fulfil the same task and objectives (Smith and Street 
2005). Ideally, any analysis that compares output or costs across organizations needs 
to clarify the underlying assumptions with regard to the relative value it allocates to 
different outputs and the way specific outputs are therefore included and weighted 
in the model (Smith and Street 2005). 
Clearly, in the context of the multi-product hospital world, the former is very 
complex. Various approaches have been used to account for this complexity such as 
creating a single index of outputs, estimation of a cost rather than a production 
function or the use of distance functions (Coelli and Perelman 2000; Shepard 1970). 
Smith and Street (2005) point out that common to all approaches is that the weight 
for each output is calculated via the sample mean cost of producing an additional 
unit of output. This implies that weights are not allocated with reference to societal 
values, but rather estimated as a by-product of statistical estimation (Smith and 
Street 2005). As a consequence most models implicitly assume that the expenditure 
allocation decisions of managers and physicians within hospitals reflect the values 
that society places on different outputs (Smith and Street 2005). Moreover, all 
models attach zero weight to any output that is not explicitly specified in the 
production model. Hence any resources devoted to outputs, which do not enter the 
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model, are hypothesized to contribute to inefficiency or illegitimate cost variation. 
Thirdly, assumptions with regard to the nature of the rate of return from additional 
units of output, i.e. constant versus variable returns, considerably affect the weights 
that are attached to different outputs.  
2.8 Dynamic nature of production 
Unsolved is the question how to deal with the dynamic nature of the production 
process as current performance depends on past inheritances. Furthermore, hospital 
managers also invest resources in future attainments (Smith and Street 2005). 
Adequate measures for organizational endowments are lacking. Given these 
limitations, estimating cost determinants or inefficiency scores by analysing panel 
data might be a more suitable way to account for dynamic effects in the production 
process (Bond 2002; Jacobs et al. 2006; Smith and Street 2005).  
2.9 Modelling the error term 
One of the fundamental innovations of the SFA is interpreting the residuals, i.e. the 
difference between observed hospital costs or outputs and that predicted, as 
comprising random error and inefficiency. These two components are assumed to be 
distributed differently: for the random error term a normal distribution is assumed, 
while the inefficiency part can take various distributional forms. However, for cross-
sectional data no economic or statistical criteria are available to inform the choice of 
the distributional characteristics of the inefficiency term (Newhouse 1994; Schmidt 
and Sickles 1984). Researchers are commonly provided with four distributions which 
they can apply to the inefficiency error term: a half-normal, a truncated-normal, 
exponential or a gamma distribution (Greene 2004). The choice of the distribution 
generates different estimates of average inefficiency in the sample as a whole and of 
relative inefficiency of individual hospitals (Jacobs et al. 2006; Rosko and Mutter 
2008; Zuckerman et al. 1994). Overall, the significance of the impact of different 
distributions on relative and average inefficiency (Jacobs et al. 2006; Rosko and 
Mutter 2008; Zuckerman et al. 1994) seems to be limited, especially when 
comparing it to the difference resulting from decomposing inefficiency into two 
components versus interpreting the entire residuals as inefficiency using COLS 
(Jacobs et al. 2006: 57).  
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2.10 One versus two stage estimation 
Identifying correlate variables of inefficiency such as firm-specific or environmental 
variables is highly relevant for the identification of “legitimate” sources of hospital 
performance variation. The analysis of the former can be conducted in one or two 
stages (Rosko and Mutter 2008). The first generation of SFA studies use two-stage 
approaches in which inefficiency estimates are calculated in a first step and in a 
second stage these estimates are regressed against a set of factors thought to 
correlate with inefficiency (Pitt and Lee 1981). One stage approaches simultaneously 
estimate the stochastic frontier and the inefficiency model, which allows estimating 
the effect of hospital specific and environmental variables directly (Battese and 
Coelli 1995; Coelli et al. 2005; Hjalmarsson et al. 1996; Wang and Schmidt 2002). 
Research indicates that two-stage estimation leads to substantially biased results (Li 
and Rosenman 2001; Rosko and Mutter 2008; Wang and Schmidt 2002) and should 
hence be interpreted with great caution and where possible ought to be checked 
against results from one stage estimation.  
3 Efficiency analysis 
3.1 The main approaches to efficiency analysis: SFA and DEA 
The two main techniques to measure relative efficiency are Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA), which is a form of econometric model, and Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), which is a form of linear optimization. We introduce and compare 
each of these techniques briefly.  
SFA is a special form of the standard econometric model that builds on production 
theory. The standard model takes the general form: 
1
M
k m mk k
m
Y z           (2) 
where kY  is the total amount of output for each organization 1...k K ,  is a 
constant and we have a set of 1...m M explanatory variables mz . These explanatory 
variables might measure the amount of labour or capital input used by each 
organization or the constraints faced by the organization in attaining the production 
frontier. m  captures the influence of a particular explanatory variable mz  on 
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output. If 
m
 is positive, the explanatory variable has a positive influence on output. 
The error term  captures the imperfect relationship between these explanatory 
variables (i.e. the model) and observed output. 
SFA has been developed to address a fundamental measurement problem: 
inefficiency is unobservable. How can one measure something that is not there: the 
lack of effort that an organization ought to exert, for instance? SFA tries to solve this 
problem in two stages.  
First, it specifies the form and location of the production frontier. This involves 
comparing different organizations producing the same things, to see which 
organization(s) are doing best. This involves specifying a production model where
( )k mkY f z . We shall consider this specification in more detail shortly. 
Second, the production of the remaining organizations is compared to the frontier, 
so that unobservable inefficiency is estimated by the distance from the frontier. 
However, as we noted in equation (1), true (unobserved) performance is also 
measured imperfectly, captured previously by the error term . But in the context 
of inefficiency, the term  captures both measurement error and inefficiency. The 
SFA model disentangles these components, so that u v , where u  captures 
inefficiency and v  captures measurement or modelling error. The standard 
equation, then, is re-specified as: 
1
M
m m mk k k
m
Y u vz         (3) 
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the process, taken from the World Health 
Organization’s attempt the measure the relative performance of different countries 
in producing health (World Health Organization, 2000). Here we observe Disability 
Adjusted Life Expectancy (DALE) as the output of production and health expenditure 
per capita as the input. Each dot represents a unit of observation – each is a country 
in this example. The SFA frontier runs through the cloud of observations but not 
through the uppermost data points. Some points lie above the frontier because of 
measurement error v . For points below the frontier, the vertical distance comprises 
a combination of inefficiency u  and measurement error v . 
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DEA derives from an engineering tradition that presumes accurate data, so does not 
allow for measurement error. This greatly simplifies the production model which, in 
its most basic form, is specified as the ratio of output to input. This conforms to the 
simple notion that an organization that employs less input than another to produce 
the same amount of output can be considered more efficient. Those observations 
with the highest ratios of output to input are considered efficient, and the efficiency 
frontier is constructed by joining these observations up in the input-output space. 
The frontier thus comprises a series of linear segments connecting one efficient 
observation to another. Inefficient organizations are “enveloped” by the efficiency 
frontier in DEA. The inefficiency of the organizations within the frontier boundary is 
calculated relative to this “envelope”, as can be seen in Figure 2, using the same 
dataset as in Figure 1, but employing DEA instead of SFA. Thus, while careful 
specification of the production model is required for SFA, when applying DEA the 
location (and the shape) of the efficiency frontier is determined by the data. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: An example of a stochastic frontier going through a cloud of observations 
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DEA models can be run for both constant returns to scale (CRS) and a more flexible 
variable returns to scale (VRS) (as shown in Figure 2) which may be appropriate 
when not all organizations can be considered to be operating at an optimal scale.  
3.2 Comparing DEA and SFA 
As described earlier, DEA and SFA take different approaches to establishing the 
location and shape of the production frontier, and to determining where each 
organization is located in relation to the frontier. Here we briefly summarize these 
differences. This is important because these differences are the reasons why the 
techniques produce different estimates of the relative efficiency of individual 
organizations.  
SFA controls for supposed influences on output, and contends that unexplained 
variations in output are due – in part, at least – to inefficiency. Unlike standard 
econometric models, therefore, where interest lies in the explanatory variables, SFA 
models extract organization-specific estimates of inefficiency from the unexplained 
part of the model. The implication is that standard econometric tools to test model 
specification cannot be applied to SFA models both because of the interpretation 
placed on k  and because organization-specific rather than average estimates are 
required. Thus un-testable judgments need to be made about the adequacy of 
Figure 2: An example of a DEA frontier enveloping a cloud of observations 
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stochastic frontier models and the inefficiency estimates they yield (Smith and Street 
2005). 
In applying DEA the location and shape of the frontier are established by the data. 
The outermost observations, those with the highest level of output given their scale 
of operation, are deemed efficient. Referring back to figures 1 and 2, DEA would 
consider observations lying at the upper extreme of the data cloud to be fully 
efficient, whereas SFA may consider that these organizations exhibit some degree of 
inefficiency.  
The consequence of plotting the frontier through the outermost observations is that 
DEA is highly flexible, the frontier moulding itself to the data. The drawback, though, 
is that the frontier is sensitive to organizations that have unusual types, levels or 
combinations of inputs or outputs. These will have a scarcity of adjacent reference 
observations (usually termed “peers”), perhaps resulting in sections of the “frontier” 
being inappropriately positioned. 
While DEA might be thought to win out over the SFA method in terms of flexibility, 
this is offset by how the technique interprets any distance from the frontier. There 
are two key differences. Firstly, DEA assumes correct model specification and that all 
data are observed without error while SFA allows for the possibility of modelling and 
measurement error. Consequently, even if the two techniques yield an identical 
frontier, SFA efficiency estimates are likely to be higher than those produced by DEA.  
Secondly, DEA uses a selective amount of data to estimate each organization’s 
efficiency score. DEA generates an efficiency score for each organization by 
comparing it only to peers that produce a comparable mix of outputs. This has two 
implications.  
(1) If any output is unique to an organization, it will have no peers with which to 
make a comparison, irrespective of the fact that it may produce other 
common outputs. An absence of peers results in the automatic assignation of 
full efficiency for the organization under consideration.  
 
 Determinants of hospital costs and performance variation 
 39 
(2) When assigning an efficiency score to an organization not lying on the 
frontier, only its peers are considered, with information pertaining to the 
remainder of the sample discarded. In contrast, SFA appeals to the full 
sample information when estimating relative efficiency.  
 
In addition to making greater use of the available data, this facet of the SFA 
approach will make the sample’s efficiency estimates more robust in the presence of 
outlier observations and to the presence of atypical input/output combinations. But 
this advantage over DEA is mainly a matter of degree – the location of (sections of) 
the DEA frontier may be determined by outliers, but outliers also exert influence on 
where the SFA frontier is positioned. Moreover, there are no statistical criteria for 
sorting these unusual observations into outliers or examples of best practice (Smith 
and Street 2005). 
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